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The European Union’s Potential Contribution to Enhanced Governance of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the Arctic 
 
Nengye Liu
*
 
 
This article focuses on the European Union (EU)’s potential contribution to an enhanced 
legal regime of the Arctic offshore oil and gas operations. It first briefly describes existing 
international law for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic. The 
article then discusses the development of EU’s Arctic policy and the EU’s competence to 
regulate Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. Subsequently, it analyzes potential actions and 
initiatives that could be taken by the EU to promote high safety standards for offshore oil and 
gas operations in the Arctic. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to a widely cited United States Geological Survey report, about 13% of the 
world’s undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and up to 30% of global gas reserves are in 
the Arctic, of which 84% is offshore.
1
 This may not be good news for the Arctic marine 
environment. As demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico,
2
 
there are significant risks associated with offshore oil and gas activities in marine ecosystems. 
The release of oil through accidents or operations of offshore platforms could cause 
significant damage to a fragile marine ecosystem like the Arctic. This could occur through 
spills from accidental blowouts at the well; accidents involving tankers transporting oil and 
gas; operational pollution from offshore installations, harbours and from oil tankers; 
accidental releases from storage or during offloading; or discharges from pipelines.
3
  
 
Exploration and development in the Arctic requires expensive, tailored technologies as well 
as safeguards adapted to the extreme climatic conditions.
4
 The lack of existing infrastructure 
and the likely high cost of any development in geographically remote and climatically harsh 
conditions mean that the economics of any new project will depend to a large extent on the 
size of discoveries and the oil price, which, in turn, will be impacted by the development of 
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other sources of oil supply (for example, United States (US) unconventional oil) and 
alternative energies.
5
 
 
However, as long as global energy demand increases and fossil fuels are the world's primary 
energy source,
6
 it appears inevitable that humans may start drilling in the Arctic for oil and 
gas.
7
 In fact, a number of companies have already been pursuing exploration projects in 
Arctic waters. Examples include Shell in the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea; Cairn in offshore 
Greenland; Rosneft/ExxonMobil in the Kara Sea; and Rosneft/ENI in the Russian Barents 
Sea.
8
 Therefore, the key issue for offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic is to create a 
legal regime that strikes a balance between possible adverse environmental consequences 
(e.g., oil spills) in the offshore Arctic and the economic benefits from hydrocarbon 
development.
9
 
 
There is no doubt that the European Union (EU) has become a global actor. The global or 
international context in which the EU has sought to define its identity, promote its interests 
and construct its policies, is increasingly seen as the stage on which the EU must act.
10
 The 
EU is inextricably linked to the Arctic. Three Arctic countries are EU Member States 
(Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the EU maintains close relations with Iceland and 
Norway (excluding Svalbard) through the European Economic Area (EEA).
11
 
 
The EU published its first Arctic policy in 2008, focusing on the (i) protection and 
preservation of the Arctic in unison with its population; (ii) promotion of the sustainable use 
of resources; and (iii) enhancement of Arctic multilateral governance.
12
 As a major consumer, 
importer and technology provider of energy and raw materials, the EU is an actor in global 
energy politics
13
 and it has an interest and capacity in the resource policy development in the 
Arctic States.
14  
The EU has even committed itself to promote high safety standards for 
offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic through Directive 2013/30.
15
 Nevertheless, the 
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EU has no territorial jurisdiction over offshore oil and gas operations in Arctic marine areas 
(Greenland has become governmentally autonomous from Denmark
16 
and is not a part of the 
EU).
17
 It is therefore still unclear how the EU could effectively achieve its policy objectives. 
 
In the context of the rise of the EU as a global regulatory power,
18
 this article examines the 
EU’s potential contribution to enhancing the current international regime of offshore oil and 
gas operations in the Arctic. The article first offers a brief description of the current 
international regime for offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic. Based on a review of 
the literature as well as qualitative interviews,
19
 the article discusses the EU’s Arctic policy, 
competence as well as actions that could possibly promote high safety standards for offshore 
oil and gas operations in the Arctic.  
 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
 
Globally, the most significant increase in temperature is in the Arctic.
20
 Warnings about rapid 
sea ice melting in the Arctic have been highlighted on various occasions.
21
 Regardless of the 
exact point in time when the Arctic will become ice free, it is fair to say that some parts of 
Arctic waters are becoming more accessible due to improved technologies and changes in sea 
ice related to climate change.
22
 There are a number of global conventions that provide some 
regulation of offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic.
23
 The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea
24
 (UNCLOS, in particular Art. 208
25
 and 214
26
) establishes coastal 
States’ jurisdiction in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. A series of 
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international conventions and guidelines adopted under the auspices of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) are also relevant for the protection of the marine environment 
against offshore oil and gas activities. These include the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78),
27
 the 1990 International Convention 
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC),
28
 the 1972 Convention on 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London 
Convention) and its 1996 Protocol,
29
 as well as the non-binding 2009 Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code).
30
 In 
particular, OPRC applies to ‘offshore units’, which means any fixed or floating offshore 
installation or structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production 
activities, or loading or unloading of oil.
31
 
 
It is worth noting, however, that MARPOL, OPRC and the London Convention deal mainly 
with pollution (operational, accidental and dumping) from shipping. They are only of limited 
relevance for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from offshore oil and gas 
operations. For example, Article 2 of the MARPOL specifically provides that ‘discharge’ 
does not include the release of harmful substances directly arising from the exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources.
32
 Moreover, 
these treaties are not designed to provide a coherent, complete system of international accords 
for offshore hydrocarbon activity.
33
 Furthermore, none of the treaties deals specifically with 
industrial activity such as the operation of mobile offshore drilling units when they are on 
station.
34
  In November 2014, the IMO adopted the International Code for Ships Operating in 
Polar Waters (Polar Code).
35
 The adoption of a mandatory Polar Code is an initial response 
from the international community to address increased shipping activities in the Arctic. Its 
role for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic so far, however, is 
limited. 
 
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR)
36
 addresses the prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore sources in 
Annex III and its range extends throughout the North-East Atlantic. It is concerned with the 
prevention and elimination of pollutants as well as ensuring the sustainable use of the sea.
37
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Although the OSPAR covers part of the Arctic Ocean
38
, most OSPAR decisions are not 
Arctic-specific.
 39
  
Two regional instruments have also been adopted that specifically address offshore oil and 
gas extraction in the Arctic. The Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines
40
 propose a non-
binding set of suggested best practices for oil and gas extraction designed to advise industry 
officials and government regulators.
41
 The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic
42
 was adopted under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council in 2013. The Agreement commits the parties to establish and maintain 
national systems for pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, to notify other parties 
of oil pollution incidents, to deploy available resources to monitor Arctic maritime areas 
(including, in some circumstances, high seas areas) for possible oil pollution incidents, to 
facilitate information exchange and assistance in oil spill preparedness and response 
operations, to coordinate joint response operations, and cooperate in joint exercises and joint 
reviews of operations.
43
  It has not entered into force. 
 
According to Article 208.5 UNCLOS, States, acting especially through competent 
international organizations or diplomatic conferences, shall establish global and regional 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities.
44
 
The number of recent serious oil spill incidents (e.g., the 2008 Deepwater Horizon disaster) 
demonstrates certain deficiencies in the way that petroleum companies conduct offshore 
operations and the manner in which national authorities control them.
45
 The Deepwater 
Horizon disaster has provided a boost to the development and further strengthening of 
accidental pollution regimes worldwide. For example, the Mediterranean (Madrid) Offshore 
Protocol was finally ratified and entered into force in March 2011, 17 years after its 
adoption.
46
 In a harsh, vulnerable Arctic marine environment, if drilling activities have to be 
conducted, the strictest standards and highest safety levels must be followed. By virtue of 
their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean, the five 
Arctic coastal States (the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland) are in a 
unique position to address challenges in the Arctic.
47
 However, all States in the world, 
including the EU and its Member States, are obliged to contribute to enhancing the current 
regime to ensure a sustainable future for the Arctic.
48
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THE EU’S ARCTIC POLICY AND COMPETENCE 
 
The European Commission first published its policy objectives regarding hydrocarbons in the 
Arctic in 2008. The document stated that support for the exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon 
resources should be provided while paying full respect to strict environmental standards, 
taking into account the particular vulnerability of the Arctic.
49
 In particular, the EU 
encourages the observance of the highest possible environmental standards and presses for 
the introduction of binding international standards, building inter alia on the guidelines of the 
Arctic Council and relevant international conventions.
50
 In 2012, the Commission further 
stated that the EU has a vital interest in ensuring maximum safety for workers in the offshore 
oil and gas industry and protection of the environment. Avoiding negative environmental 
effects in the sensitive Arctic is crucial.
51
 In 2014, the Council of the European Union (the 
Council) requested the Commission and the High Representative to present proposals for the 
further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy by December 2015.
52
 
Although the new proposal might be delayed due to the change of the President of European 
Commission in 2014,
53
 it is expected that a new proposal for the EU’s Arctic policy will be 
announced in the near future. 
 
It is a cardinal principle of EU law that the EU has the competence to adopt policies and 
legislation only to the extent that such competence has been conferred on it by the Member 
States through the EU treaties.
54 
The EU does not have a specific Arctic mandate from its 
Member States. However, this is not an obstacle for the EU to act on issues related to the 
Arctic. One of the main concerns of energy development in the Arctic, particularly in the 
marine area (offshore), is the potential environmental impacts on the fragile Arctic 
ecosystem.
55
 Pollution from offshore oil and gas operations, no matter whether they are 
accidental or operational, will result in adverse consequences for the Arctic marine 
environment. Moreover, while climate change creates opportunities for offshore oil and gas 
development in the Arctic, human activity connected with this development is expected to 
cause further greenhouse gas emissions.
56
 The EU has a solid legal basis to take action 
regarding this issue, as discussed below. 
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According to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union shall contribute to the 
sustainable development of the Earth in its relations with the wider world.
57
 Moreover, the 
EU should define and pursue common policies and actions, and should work for a high 
degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to help develop 
international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, so as to ensure sustainable 
development.
58
 It is further provided in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.
59
 EU environmental policy should further contribute to the pursuit 
of promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.
60
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has ensured that energy is now explicitly included in the list of EU 
competences, one mainly shared between the EU and Member States.
61 
EU competences for 
environmental policy are furthermore linked with the shared competence in energy. This is 
evident in Article 194 of the TFEU, which states that EU energy policy is to be developed in 
‘the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for 
the need to preserve and improve the environment’.62 This shared competence is not only 
constrained to the internal market.
63
 Dating as far back as 1971, the ERTA/AETR case of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) clearly stated that the Community acquires external 
competence when it adopts internal legislation on the same subject matter.
64
 The Deepwater 
Horizon disaster played a major role in the EU’s realization that the risk of a major offshore 
oil or gas accident occurring in EU waters is significant and that the existing fragmented 
legislation and diverse regulatory and industry practices do not sufficiently reduce the risks 
for the EU.
65
 Directive 2013/30 was adopted, with specific reference to the Arctic waters. 
The EU therefore implicitly acquired external competence regarding offshore oil and gas 
operations on the basis of the adoption of the Directive 2013/30 to promote, negotiate and 
conclude conventions with third States at both the regional and international levels. 
 
PROMOTING EU STANDARDS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
                                                          
57
 TEU, n. 54 above, Article 3.5. 
58
 Ibid., Article 21.2(f). 
59
 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2010] OJ C83/47 (‘TFEU’), 
Article 11. 
60
 Ibid., Article 191.1. 
61
 Ibid., Article 4.2. See also T Koivurova et al., ‘The Present and Future Competence of the European Union in 
the Arctic’, 48:4 Polar Record (2012), 361, at 366. 
62
 TFEU, n. 59 above, Article 194. See also T. Koivurova et al., EU Competencies Affecting the Arctic 
(European Parliament, 2010), at 24. 
63
 For a general analysis of the EU’s external energy policy, see B. Van Vooren, Europe Unplugged, Progress, 
Potential and Limitations of EU External Energy Policy Three Years Post-Lisbon (Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies 2012). 
64
 ECJ, Case C-22/70 Commission v. Council, [1971] ECR.263, at paragraph 19: ‘With regard to the 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the system of internal Community measures may not therefore be 
separated from that of external relations”. While the ERTA/AETR doctrine itself is no longer contested, the 
conditions of its application remain contentious. They are still the subject of both academic discussion, 
institutional debate and new case law.’ See C. Hillion, ‘ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of 
the EU System of External Relations’, in: D. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU 
Law The Classic of EU Law Revisited on the 50
th
 Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart, 2010), 224, at 225. 
65
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Prospections, Exploration and Production Activities, COM(2011) 688, at 2. 
 
 
At first glance, it appears difficult for the EU to promote high safety standards for offshore 
oil and gas operations in the Arctic, simply because of the fact that most offshore activities 
happen in national waters of Arctic coastal States. Nevertheless, the EU, as an important 
economic bloc, is capable to directly and indirectly apply its standards beyond the EU. 
 
DIRECT APPLICATION OF EU LAW IN THE ARCTIC 
 
Inspired by the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Directive 2013/30 was adopted with specific 
reference to the Arctic waters.
66
 In particular, Article 20 of Directive 2013/30 provides that 
‘Member States shall require companies registered in their territory and conducting, 
themselves or through subsidiaries, offshore oil and gas operations outside the Union as 
licence holders or operators to report to them, on request, the circumstances of any major 
accident in which they have been involved’.67 
 
The high costs of doing business in the Arctic suggests that only the world’s largest oil and 
gas companies may have the financial, technical, and managerial strength to meet the costs 
and long lead-times for projects that are dictated by challenging Arctic conditions.
68
 
Therefore, oil giants like BP and Shell, whose headquarters are based in EU Member States 
(London and The Hague, respectively) have to follow Directive 2013/30 and report their 
major accidents in the Arctic. Having this type of control over companies such as BP and 
Shell is a significant initial step to improving the safety of offshore drilling in the Arctic. It 
will go some way to ensuring that big oil companies based in the EU think long and hard 
before they embark on a risky adventure in the Arctic.
69
 
 
Nevertheless, this is only an initial step. The reporting obligation only covers major accidents. 
This obligation should be expanded to activities related to prevention, reduction and control 
of pollution from offshore oil and gas operations. Moreover, there is to date no standard for 
reporting. Common reporting standards should be developed for oil companies regardless of 
whether such companies are registered in the EU or conducting offshore activities within 
European waters. Furthermore, if oil companies are unwilling to report their activities outside 
the EU,
70
 Directive 2013/30 provides no solution to ensure the compliance of reporting 
obligations by oil companies. National authorities might make use of a ‘name and shame list’, 
which publishes the names of those oil companies who are in violation of reporting 
obligations.  
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In the aftermath of the Erika oil tanker disaster, the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) was established by Regulation 1406/2002.
71
 The EMSA provides technical and 
scientific advice to the Commission in the field of maritime safety and prevention of 
pollution by ships in the continuous process of updating and developing new legislation, 
monitoring its implementation and evaluating the effectiveness of the measures in place. The 
role of EMSA was considerably expanded by Regulation 724/2004 to include an increased 
emphasis on maritime security alongside the response to pollution by ships.
72
 In practice, the 
EMSA is playing an increasingly important role in monitoring the implementation of EU 
legislation on shipping given the Commission’s lack of human resources. Assisted by the 
EMSA, the Commission issues several reasoned opinions to Member States every year, and 
does not hesitate to take Member States to the CJEU when necessary.
73
 
 
Directive 2013/30 also sets out the responsibilities of the EMSA. However, relative to its 
significant role in the shipping industry, the EMSA has played only a limited role in the field 
of offshore oil and gas operations. According to Article 10 of Directive 2013/30/EU, the 
EMSA shall ‘assist the Commission and the affected Member State, on its request, in 
detecting and monitoring the extent of an oil or gas spill’.74 The EMSA shall also ‘assist 
Member States, at their request, with the preparation and execution of external emergency 
response plans, especially when there are transboundary impacts within and beyond offshore 
waters of Member States’.75 The EMSA’s role could be strengthened so as to ensure the 
compliance of EU oil companies in the Arctic with Directive 2013/30. For example, the 
EMSA could be authorized to send inspection staff to offshore oil and gas installations 
outside EU waters operated by companies registered in EU Member States. The 
implementation of EU standards by EU oil companies operating in the Arctic could pave the 
way for the EU to enhance its regulatory role in offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic. 
 
INDIRECT APPLICATION OF EU STANDARDS IN THE ARCTIC 
 
The Brussels effect  
 
The EU has the world’s largest internal market, supported by strong regulatory institutions. 
Trading with the EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production to EU 
standards. While the EU regulates only its internal market, multinational corporations often 
have an incentive to standardize their production globally and adhere to a single rule.
76
 This 
converts the EU rule into a global rule. This was labelled by Anu Bradford as the ‘de facto 
Brussels effect’.77 Unlike negotiated standards and unilateral coercion, this kind of regulatory 
power that the EU possesses is more durable, more deployable, and less easily undermined by 
others.
78
 The EU has succeeded in using market access as a tool to leverage the ‘migration’ of 
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its frequently demanding norms abroad.
79
 For example, Member States are required by the 
Seafarers Directive to ensure that only seafarers properly trained and certified in accordance 
with the relevant international standards can serve on ships that are registered in EU.
80
 As a 
result, seafarers in a third country have to follow EU standards for their training in order to 
work in EU-flagged vessels. 
 
The Brussels effect could possibly be applied in the Arctic as well. There are generally three 
different types of pollution deriving from offshore oil and gas operations: intentional 
pollution, accidental pollution and operations pollution. Operational pollution is pollution 
arising as a result of the normal operation of offshore installations, such as discharges of oil 
in produced water, contaminated drill cuttings and muds, production chemicals, sewage, 
garbage, deck drainage, naturally occurring materials (radionuclides, heavy metals and 
aromatics) as well as atmospheric emissions.
81
 Pollution from offshore oil and gas operations 
is like vessel-source pollution, which is most well known due to several high profile 
accidents such as Torrey Canyon (1967), Amoco Cadiz (1987), Exxon Valdez (1989), Erika 
(1999) and Prestige (2002). In fact, the daily discharge of oil and oily mixtures, noxious 
liquid chemicals, sewage, garbage and air pollution from ships are the main cause of long-
term damage to the marine environment.
82
 While the scale of operational pollution from 
offshore oil and gas activities should not be exaggerated, it represents a growing form of 
hazard to the marine environment, especially in sensitive coastal or Arctic waters.
83
 
 
Directive 2013/30 aims at establishing minimum requirements for preventing major accidents 
in offshore oil and gas operations and limiting the consequences of such accidents.
84
 It pays 
most attention to accidental pollution. However, in the future, Directive 2013/30 could also 
set up uniform construction, design, equipment and manning standards (CDEM standards) to 
prevent operational pollution from offshore installations within European waters. Uniform 
CDEM standards in European waters would not only improve safety levels of offshore oil 
and gas operations from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, but could potentially also 
establish a good example for industry performance in neighbouring waters, such as the Arctic. 
World Trade Organization (WTO) law prevents countries from restricting imports from 
countries with less stringent regulations unless the importing country can provide a scientific 
justification for the restriction or if the restriction is necessary to protect public health or 
related to conservation of the environment.
85
 The EU, however, could ban the import of 
offshore oil and gas produced in the Arctic without following EU standards for the protection 
of the Arctic marine environment. This might be more effective than bilateral negotiations to 
persuade Arctic States, particularly Russia, to adopt high safety standards. This might also be 
good news for the oil and gas industry as companies conducting offshore oil and gas 
operations will no longer face different standards in different national waters within the EU. 
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European Economic Area 
 
EU efforts to create a role for itself in the Arctic have had to take the opinion of Arctic States 
into careful consideration. It is reasonable to expect Arctic States, in particular the five 
coastal States, are the most important external actors in the EU’s pursuit of a role in the High 
North.
86
 In the case of offshore oil and gas operations, Norway is playing a key role. Norway 
has traditionally been one of the States most closely involved in the management of the 
Arctic.
87
 It is Europe’s largest oil producer and the world’s third largest gas exporter.88 
Norway is a leading country in Arctic hydrocarbon production, which has geographical 
advantages and extensive experience and knowledge of energy production at sea.
89
 Moreover, 
Norway is a contracting party of the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement reaffirms the 
high priority attached to the privileged relationship between the EU, its Member States and 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland), which is based on proximity, long-standing common values and European 
identity.
90
 The EEA Agreement aims to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of 
trade and economic relations between contracting parties with equal conditions of 
competition, and the respect of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous 
European Economic Area.
91
 The non-EU members of the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway) have agreed to enact legislation similar to that passed in the EU in relation to four 
fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and persons). With regard 
to the policy fields encompassed by the EEA Agreement, the non-EU members of the EEA 
are integrated to the same extent as full members are as far as policy harmonization is 
concerned.
92
 Theoretically speaking, via the EEA Agreement, EU law regarding offshore oil 
and gas operations could possibly be implemented in the Norwegian part of the Arctic as well. 
 
To ensure homogeneity between EEA law and the constantly evolving internal market of the 
EU, novel EU legislation of relevance to the EEA is continuously added to the EEA 
Agreement through decisions of the EEA Joint Committee
93
.
94
 Interestingly, Directive 
2013/30 has identified itself as ‘EEA relevant’. Nevertheless, this position has been 
challenged by Norway.
95
 The Commission and Norway should, through the EEA Joint 
Committee, make a compromise to incorporate Norway into the implementation of Directive 
2013/30. According to empirical findings, Norwegian practice regarding EEA-related EU 
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legislation has been quite consistent with other EU Member States.
96
 Norway has 
implemented most EU legislation in the energy sector. Moreover, Norway played an 
important role in influencing the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy,97 in particular with regard 
to the policy’s Arctic dimension.98 It is also worth noting that Norway,99 the EU and even the 
UK
100
 share common interests in promoting the highest environmental and drilling standards 
for offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic. Therefore, it would be a win-win situation if 
Norway and the EU could finally find a compromise regarding the implementation of 
Directive 2013/30. Through Norway, the regulatory role of the EU regarding offshore oil and 
gas operations could be much stronger in the Arctic. Meanwhile, with the 28 EU Member 
States, Norway could possibly in a better position to upload its offshore oil and gas standards 
to the international level. 
 
TOWARDS AN ARCTIC-SPECIFIC LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT 
 
The Commission and EU Member States should promote high safety standards for offshore 
oil and gas operations at the international level in relevant global and regional fora, in 
particular the Arctic Council.
101
 Given the fact that there are no universally agreed 
international standards for offshore drilling on the continental shelf, an international 
agreement would provide the industry with a standard to meet, regardless of where in the 
world it was drilling.
102
 The EU could support this kind of initiative. For example, the Global 
Ocean Commission,
103
 in its Rescue Package for the Global Ocean, proposes to adopt and 
improve international safety and environmental standards for offshore drilling on the 
continental shelf, including regional protocols to establish and implement such standards, 
with provisions for response-preparedness and capacity building in developing countries.
104
 
A similar proposal has been initiated by the Indonesian Government after the 2009 Montara 
Oil Spill in the Timor Sea, off the northern coast of Western Australia.
105
 However, even if 
an international convention on offshore drilling could be adopted in the foreseeable future, it 
is not that meaningful for the Arctic. An international convention has to compromise interests 
from around the world, which may not be able to provide highest safety standards for the 
Arctic. 
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It is therefore suggested that the EU should make significant efforts to promote an Arctic-
specific legally binding agreement on offshore oil and gas operations, which would include 
the highest safety standards, within the Arctic Council. As the EU is not a coastal State of the 
Arctic, it has no voting rights in the Arctic Council. The EU’s actions in the Arctic might also 
be seen by Arctic States as a ‘political intrusion’. Nevertheless, as a major consumer, 
importer and technology provider of Arctic energy and raw materials, the EU should 
definitely have a say in the governance of offshore oil and gas operations in its neighbouring 
waters, which include the Arctic. 
 
As mentioned above, the EU has established minimum requirements for preventing major 
accidents in offshore oil and gas operations and limiting the consequences of such accidents 
by Directive 2013/30. In the foreseeable future, it is suggested that Directive 2013/30 could 
also be extended to cover CDEM standards for the prevention of operational pollution from 
offshore oil and gas activities. The EU therefore has set up a model for this Arctic-specific 
legally binding agreement. Moreover, market access could be a tool for the EU to incentivize 
Arctic States to consider benefits of the adoption of a legally-binding agreement. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ideally, for the protection of the vulnerable Arctic, offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic 
should be completely banned. However, a ban seems to be impossible as long as the world 
economy still depends on fossil fuels. At the same time, the current international and regional 
regime for the regulation of Arctic offshore oil and gas operations is weak and fragmented. 
Therefore, the EU, as a major player in global energy politics, is obliged to make a 
contribution to enhance the current regime for a sustainable future of the Arctic. 
 
The EU appears to have a marginal role in Arctic policy making due to the fact that it has no 
coastal line in the Arctic. However, as outlined in this article, there are a number of potential 
ways in which the EU may be able to play an influential part. The EU has already taken the 
initial step by requiring companies registered in the EU to report major accidents outside the 
EU waters, such as in the Arctic. This obligation could be strengthened, for instance, by the 
development of common reporting standards, The EU could set up uniform CDEM standards 
regarding the prevention of operational pollution from offshore oil and gas operations in the 
EU, which might establish a good example for its neighbouring waters, such as the Arctic. 
The EMSA can be authorized to supervise EU companies’ offshore activities in the Arctic. 
All these options could possibly provide a way for the EU to enhance its regulatory role in 
offshore oil and gas operations in the Arctic. 
 
In addition, if the EU could find a compromise with Norway to implement Directive 2013/30, 
the regulatory role of the EU on offshore oil and gas operations could be much stronger in the 
Arctic. Finally, it is suggested that the EU should make the utmost effort to promote an 
Arctic-specific legally binding agreement with the highest safety standards for offshore oil 
and gas operations. 
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